This paper, by using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of government vis-à-vis market, which is the distinguishing feature of various models of a market economy including private orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003). It is found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market enjoy better performance, suggesting that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China. Evidence is also presented to rule out the concern that these results are driven by rent-seeking activities.
Introduction
Many developing economies have started to introduce private ownership and market competition after failures of experimenting with state ownership in much of the twentieth century. In the transition from state ownership to a market economy, however, there are di¤erent ideas and practices. The Washington Consensus, on one extreme, proposes to "stabilize, privatize, and liberalize", i.e., maintaining macroeconomic stability, pushing for domestic liberalization, privatization and openness to international trade, and drastically reducing the role of the state in the economic sphere.
1 Meanwhile, China has followed a di¤erent route: the role of government in the economy, such as enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws and national ordinances, has remained signi…cant after three decades of economic reforms (Walder, 1995; Rodrik, 2006) .
The di¤erent approaches to transiting toward a market economy could re ‡ect the fundamental di¤erences in the understanding of what a market economy should look like. Indeed, there are three distinct models of a market economy, i.e., private orderings, private litigation through courts, and regulatory state, which involve an increasing power of government vis-à-vis market. Shleifer (2002, 2003) , and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) o¤er a general framework for understanding the choice among the di¤erent models of a market economy. It is argued that, for a market economy to function properly, governments should provide protections to investors against expropriation by thieves, competitors, or tort-feasors, which are called disorder (Hobbes, 1651) . At the same time, governments should refrain from becoming expropriators themselves, which could lead to dictatorship. The control of disorder may lead to greater dictatorship while the control of government abuse may bring larger disorder (for details see Figure 1 , which is copied from Figure 1 of Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003) . The challenge is to …nd an appropriate model to balance these two costs simultaneously.
Clearly, the Washington Consensus is leaned toward private orderings and private litigation through courts as the most ideal models of a market economy so that it advocates for minimizing the role of government in the economy. However, these target models of a market economy require a host of preconditions for them to function properly. Speci…cally, for private orderings to be an e¢ cient choice, it requires protection of private property rights of one market participant against another. Meanwhile, private litigation hinges upon independent judges who are immune to in ‡uences from the rich and the politically-connected. In the former socialist economies, however, the property rights protection for private enterprises has yet to be formally established and time tested. Judges, who were not needed at all in the central-planning system, are newly appointed by the state and their independence is dubious (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008) . Indeed almost all other developing economies share the same lack or weakness of institutions that are required for the models of a market economy (i.e., private orderings and private litigation through courts) proposed by the Washington Consensus. That might be the reason why developing economies following the Washington Consensus did not display impressive economic performance (Rodrik, 2006) . And it may well be the case that regulatory state (i.e., signi…cant power of government vis-à-vis market) could be an optimal model of a market economy for these economies. 2 The success of economic reforms in countries like China, India and Vietnam has often been interpreted as the victory of an incremental and cautious reform procedure. However, from the perspective of the choice of a right model of a market economy, it could well be the result of having chosen a suitable target model (i.e., regulatory state) of a market economy that these countries are moving toward. Albeit a convincing argument, there are few empirical studies on the speci…c model of a market economy that these economies have chosen (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Ho¤ and Stiglitz, 2004) . In general, empirical evaluations of the various models of a market economy are challenging because of the di¢ culty in quantifying the power of government vis-à-vis market. In this paper, we …ll in the void by quantifying the power of government vis-à-vis market in the economy, and establish that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China.
The data used in this study comes from a survey conducted in 1999 containing a sample of 3,073 private enterprises in China. In the survey, there is a question regarding how an entrepreneur would resolve business disputes with others. The available answers are: (i) doing nothing; (ii) negotiating 2 The optimal target model depends on the institutional constraints and new developments in an economy. The experience of currently developed economies provides support to this view. According to Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) , there was a change in the optimal model of a market economy in the U.S. in the late 19th century. Before then, private litigation through courts was the major model of a market economy. However, the massive industrialization and commercialization of the American economy in the 19th century generated increasing disorder and undermined the courts as the sole institution securing property rights. Hence, the U.S. market economy leaned toward the model of a regulatory state. between themselves; (iii) seeking help from private network; (iv) court ruling; and (v) seeking government help. We group these answers into three categories corresponding to the three models of a market economy proposed by Shleifer (2002, 2003) , and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) : private orderings for answers (i), (ii), and (iii); private litigation through courts for answer (iv); and regulatory state for answer (v).
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To measure the power of government vis-à-vis market in each region, 4 we …rst assign ordinal values 1, 2 and 3 to these three categories, i.e., value 1 for private orderings, value 2 for private litigation through courts, and value 3 for regulatory state. A variable called Power of Government vis-à-vis Market is then constructed for each region based on the average value of the power of government vis-à-vis market perceived by the enterprises located in that region, with a higher value indicating a greater power of government vis-à-vis market.
We …nd that private enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes have better enterprise performance. Our results suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China. These results, however, could be biased due to some omitted variable and reverse causality issues. We then control for a host of variables related to entrepreneurial characteristics, enterprise characteristics, regional characteristics, and industry dummies, and …nd that our results remain robust to these controls.
To further deal with the possible endogeneity problems, we adopt the instrumental variable approach. We choose the distance between the capital of each region and the national capital city of China -Beijing -as an instrumental variable for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes. Over several thousand years the Chinese political system has always been characterized by the centralization of political power during most of the periods. Even today, the central government keeps the power to appoint regional government o¢ cials, and issues various laws and national ordinances for them to guide the regional administrations. Given the substantial variations in endowments, socioeconomic development and culture across regions in China, however, laws and national ordinances enacted by the central government tend to be sketchy in nature, and need to be interpreted and enforced by the regional governments so as to make them more adapted to local circumstances. Meanwhile, the degree of central government control over regional governments becomes weaker in regions farther away from Beijing, allowing more freedom for the regional government o¢ cials to interpret and enforce laws and national ordinances. Hence is the old Chinese saying of "The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away." It is thus expected that the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes is greater in regions that are farther away from Beijing. Indeed the …rst stage of two-stage-least-squares regressions con…rms the positive correlation, and the second stage shows that our earlier results regarding the impact of the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise performance remains signi…cant and robust to various controls.
For robustness checks, we use alternative measures of the power of government vis-à-vis market, focus on some subsamples of the dataset to address speci…c types of business disputes, and control for the role of the capital-labor ratio. Our results are robust to these exercises.
Our data set also allows us to test the predictions of the theoretical framework proposed by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) : an increase of disorder costs (i.e., expropriation by thieves, competitors, or tort-feasors) calls for a greater power of government vis-à-vis market whereas an increase of dictatorship costs (i.e., expropriation by governments) requires a lower power of government vis-à-vis market. Indeed, we …nd that enterprises facing more in ‡uen-tial competitors (which implies higher disorder costs) perceive a greater need for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes whereas the opposite is found when enterprises face more expropriation by the governments (which implies higher dictatorship costs).
One may interpret our results as that those enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market conduct more rent seeking activities and thus achieve better enterprise performance. We investigate this possibility by looking at various channels (i.e., input procurement, access to bank loans, availability of production locations, supply of electricity and water, recruitment of skilled labor, sales of products, and sales of services) in which enterprises may obtain favors through rent seeking activities. It is found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market do not obtain any favors along these channels, thereby ruling out the rent seeking as the driving force behind our results.
One may still be curious to know why China's regional government of…cials have incentives to enforce private contracts and resolve business disputes. Here we can draw insights from a large literature on China's economic reform. It is argued that China's central government has adopted …s-cal decentralization policy by delegating substantial discretion over regional economies to regional governments while maintaining its strict political control over regional governments, especially in the appointment and promotion of regional government o¢ cials. Under this institutional arrangement, the regional government o¢ cials have incentives to cultivate satisfactory business environments and promote economic development so as to enhance their private bene…ts of being in power and the chances of being further promoted (e.g., Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Roland, Qian, and Xu, 2006; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and variables. Empirical results and their interpretations are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data and Variables
The dataset used in this paper comes from the Private Enterprise Survey in China, which was conducted in 1999 jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Multi-stage strati…ed random sampling method is used in the Survey to achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in China. The total number of private enterprises to be surveyed was …rst determined. Afterwards, six cities/counties were selected from each of the thirty-one province-level regions (i.e., the 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities and 5 minority autonomous regions), which included the capital city of each region, one district-level city, one county-level city, and three counties. Then the number of private enterprises to be surveyed in each region was calculated as the product of the region's share of private enterprises in the national total with the total number of private enterprises in the survey. The same method was used to determine the number of sample enterprises in every city/county or industry. Finally, private enterprises were randomly chosen from each sub-sample.
The initial sample size is 3,073 enterprises. After deleting observations with no industry code, no sales and no employment …gure, we obtain the …nal sample of 2,616 private enterprises. Table 1 shows the distribution of the initial sample and …nal sample across regions in China as well as the percentage of enterprises with complete information. Jiangsu, Shandong and Guangdong have the largest numbers of observations while Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia have the smallest. The average percentage of enterprises with complete information across regions is 83.72% with standard deviation 0.086, which means the …nal sample is representative.
The dependent variable for our study is Enterprise Performance, measured by the logarithm of output per worker. This is consistent with the convention in the literature investigating the impacts of the quality of institutions on economic performance and growth. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) use the logarithm of output per worker to study the e¤ects of social infrastructures, i.e., institutions and government policies, on the crosscountry di¤erences in economic performance. Later studies such as Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) and Masters and McMillan (2002) follow suit. Robinson (2001, 2002) use logarithm of GDP per capita, which is similar in nature to the variable used here but at a more aggregate level, to study the e¤ects of institutional quality on economic growth. Subsequent studies including Alcala and Ciccone (2004) The key explanatory variable in our study is the power of government vis-à-vis market in each region. There is one question in the Survey regarding how private entrepreneurs would deal with business disputes. The available answers are: (i) doing nothing; (ii) negotiating between themselves; (iii) seeking help from private network; (iv) court ruling; and (v) seeking government help. We group them into three categories corresponding closely to the three alternative models of a market economy, as proposed by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) : private orderings for answers (i), (ii), and (iii); private litigation through courts for answer (iv), and regulatory state for answer (v). Here we take a broad de…nition of regulatory state, which includes not only enactment of laws and national ordinances, but also interpretation and enforcement of laws and national ordinances (e.g., Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001) , which, in our view, is particularly relevant to the case of China. China has a centralized political system, in which the central government appoints the regional government o¢ cials and enacts laws and national ordinances for them to guide their administrations. Due to the substantial variations in endowments, socioeconomic development and culture across regions, however, it is di¢ cult for the central government to enact uni…ed laws and national ordinances applicable to all regions. For example, it took 12 years for the National People's Congress to pass the Law on Township and Village Enter-prises (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008) . As a result, laws and national ordinances enacted by the central government tend to be sketchy in nature and need to be interpreted and enforced by the regional governments so as to make them more adapted to local circumstances. Seeking government help in resolving business disputes involves the interpretation and enforcement of laws and national ordinances by the regional governments. Hence, we take "seeking government help in business disputes"as an indicator of regulatory state.
We then assign ordinal value of 1, 2 and 3 to the three categories respectively, i.e., value 1 for private orderings, value 2 for private litigation through courts, and value 3 for regulatory state. A variable called Power of Government vis-à-vis Market is then constructed for each region based on average value of the power of government vis-à-vis market perceived by the enterprises located in that region, with a higher value indicating a greater power of government vis-à-vis market. There are variations in the power of government vis-à-vis market across China's regions, with a mean of 1.24 and a standard deviation of 0.13.
To alleviate the concern of omitted variables, we include a host of variables that may a¤ect enterprise performance. The background and capability of entrepreneurs can be important determinants of private enterprise performance. Therefore, we include some conventional managerial human capital variables like Age (the age of the entrepreneur by the end of 1999), Education (years of formal schooling), and Managerial Experiences (the number of years an entrepreneur had held a managerial position before he or she started his or her own business), and some political participation variables such as CPC Membership (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur is a member of the Chinese People's Congress and zero otherwise) and CP-PCC Membership (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and zero otherwise), Government Cadre (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur used to be a government o¢ cial and zero otherwise), and SOE Cadre (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur used to be a manager in state-owned enterprises). We also control for enterprise characteristics, such as Enterprise Size (the logarithm of the number of employees in each enterprise) and Enterprise Age (the logarithm of the number of years an enterprise had been established by the end of 1999), that have been suggested to be important for enterprise performance, and include industry dummies to account for possible di¤erences across industries. Finally, regional characteristics such as local market size measured by the Logarithm of GDP, and infrastructure measured by the Logarithm of Railway Density, are also included.
To further address the potential endogeneity issue, we adopt the instrumental variable approach. Speci…cally, we use the distance between the capital city of each region and the national capital of China -Beijing -as an instrumental variable for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes (details will be discussed in Section 3.2).
Summary statistics of all key variables are given in Table 2 .
3 Main Results
Benchmark Regressions
To investigate the impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise performance, we estimate the following equation:
where y eir is the performance of enterprise e in region r and industry i, i is the industry dummy, G r represents the power of government vis-à-vis market in region r, R r is a vector of regional characteristics, X 0 eir is a vector of other control variables (i.e., entrepreneurial and enterprise characteristics), and " eir is a random error term.
In general the standard errors for micro-level data need to be adjusted for possible clustering to deal with the heteroskadasticity problem (e.g., Liang an Zeger, 1986) . When the number of clusters is small (i.e., less than 42), however, the clustered standard errors could be misleading and unreliable (e.g., Wooldridge, 2003 Wooldridge, , 2006 Angrist and Pischke, 2008) . As the number of clusters in our study is 31, we follow Angrist and Lang (2004) in using the White-robust standard errors, i.e., HC 1 (White, 1980; MacKinnon and White, 1985) . Table 3 shows the ordinary-least-squares estimation results for equation (1) regarding the impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise performance. Column 1 reports the benchmark regression results that Power of Government vis-à-vis Market produces a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on enterprise performance.
Our results are robust when control variables related to entrepreneurial characteristics and enterprise characteristics are included stepwisely (Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 ). The coe¢ cients of control variables also make sense. It is found that an entrepreneur with a higher level of education and more years of being manager in a state-owned enterprise enjoys better enterprise performance. It is also found that smaller enterprises exhibit higher impetus to growth.
The basic message conveyed by Table 3 is clear: A greater power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes enhances enterprise performance. The result suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China. This can be understood as China lacks secure protection of private properties and independence of judges, which are essential for the functioning of private orderings and private litigation through courts.
Instrumental Variable Estimation
The estimation results in Table 3 could be biased due to the endogeneity issues. For example, we may not exhaust all the possible variables that correlate with both the power of government vis-à-vis market and enterprise performance. Meanwhile, enterprises with better performance may be more likely to cluster in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market. To address these potential endogeneity issues, we adopt the instrumental variable estimation strategy. Speci…cally, the instrumental variable used is the distance between the capital city of each region and the national capital, Beijing, where the central government is located.
Over thousands of years the Chinese political system has been characterized by the centralization of political power during most of the periods. The central government keeps the power to appoint regional government o¢ cials. It also issues various laws and national ordinances to guide the regional administrations. Because China is a large country with substantial variations in endowments, socioeconomic development and culture across regions, however, uni…ed laws and national ordinances may be ill-suited for the local conditions of some regions. Thus it is essential for regional government of…cials to interpret and enforce laws and national ordinances so as to make them more adapted to the local circumstances. Meanwhile, it is more costly for the central government to frequently inspect local situations and monitor local bureaucrats in regions farther away from Beijing. Consequently, the higher degree of information asymmetry makes the central government more reliant on local o¢ cials in regional governance. Thus, regional bureaucrats in regions farther away from Beijing are subject to less central control and have a greater degree of freedom in interpreting and enforcing laws and national ordinances. In other words, regional government o¢ cials in regions farther away from Beijing have greater de facto powers in running the regional economy. Indeed there is an old Chinese saying that "The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away." It is thus expected that in regions farther away from Beijing, the powers of regional government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes are greater.
One concern of the validity of this instrumental variable is that it might a¤ect enterprise performance through channels other than the power of government vis-à-vis market, such as climate and endowments. This, however, should not be a concern in our case. The national capital, Beijing, is located in the northern-central area of the country with many regions lying to the north, south, west or east of the capital. Therefore, distance from Beijing does not suggest any particular endowment and climate characteristics. For example, Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang province and Shanghai have similar distances from Beijing with linear distances of 1,049 kilometers and 1,066 kilometers from Beijing, respectively. However, these two regions have striking di¤erences in endowments and climate. Figure 2 shows the positive correlation between the power of regional government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes and the distance between regional capital city and Beijing. Table 4 presents the two-stageleast-squares estimation results. The …rst-stage regression results reported in Column 1 show that the distance between regional capital city and Beijing has a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, which con…rms our argument that in regions farther away from Beijing the powers of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes are greater. Meanwhile, the relevance condition for our instrumental variable is further con…rmed by the Anderson cannonical LR statistic. And the Cragg-Donald F-statistic rules out the concern for weak instrument. 6 Column 2 of Table 4 presents the second-stage regression results. The results reinforce our earlier …ndings and show that the power of government vis-à-vis market has a positive and statistically signi…cant causal e¤ect on enterprise performance. Our main results -the statistically signi…cant positive impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise performance -remain robust when entrepreneurial and enterprise characteristics are included as control variables (in Columns 3-4 of Table 4 ).
Robustness Checks
First, we investigate whether our main results are robust to alternative ordinal values assigned to the three categories of a market economy, i.e., private orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state in constructing the index of the power of government vis-à-vis market. In Section 2, we assigned values 1-3 to these three categories of a market economy with the purpose of showing an increasing power of government vis-à-vis market. One may argue that the ordinal values assigned look somewhat arbitrary. To make sure that the absolute value assigned to each category does not matter but the relative ranking is important, we experiment with di¤erent values attached to each category. In the …rst experiment, we give the value of 1 to private orderings, 2 to private litigations through courts and 10 to regulatory state. In the second experiment, we let private orderings be 1, private litigation be 9 and regulatory state be 10. In the third experiment, we assign values of 1, 5 and 10 to private orderings, private litigations and regulatory state, respectively.
Columns 2-4 of Table 5 summarize the estimation results when the above three alternative constructions for the power of government vis-à-vis market are used, while Column 1 simply replicates Column 4 of Table 4 as the benchmark for comparison. All the control variables are included in the regressions but not reported to save space. It is clear that our main results reported in Tables 3-4 remain robust when we vary the values assigned to di¤erent categories of a market economy, which con…rms that the exact value assigned to each category does not matter, but the relative ranking of the three categories is important.
Second, we use an alternative measure of the power of government vis-à-vis market. Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2003) has an index on the power of government in the economy, with a higher value indicating a lower power of government in the economy. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the FanWang-Zhu index is negatively correlated with the distance between regional capital city and Beijing (in Panel B of Column 1), and it has a negative and statistically signi…cant causal e¤ect on enterprise performance (in Panel A of Column 1), which are consistent with our earlier …ndings.
Third, we test the robustness of our results using a subsample of our dataset. In the Survey, there is a question regarding the identity of the party with whom an enterprise is having business disputes. It could be: with customers, or suppliers, or government agencies. As disputes with government agencies could be qualitatively di¤erent from those with commercial partners, we restrict our sample to those observations with only commercial disputes.
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that our central results remain robust to the use of this subsample.
Lastly, it has been argued that enterprise performance could be a¤ected by the capital-labor ratio. Unfortunately, there is quite a lot of missing information on the amount of capital employed by enterprises in our dataset. Nonetheless, we conduct a robustness test based on a reduced sample by including the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio as a control variable for enterprise performance. As shown in Column 3 of Table 6 , our main results still hold in this subsample. 7 Overall, our robustness analysis as summarized in Tables 5-6 con…rms our earlier …nding that the power of government vis-a-vis market has a positive and signi…cant causal e¤ect on enterprise performance in China.
A Comparative Statics Analysis
Our above empirical analysis is based on the theoretical framework proposed by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) . To lend support for our empirical analysis, we test the predictions of this theoretical framework regarding when there is a need for a greater power of government vis-à-vis market in choosing the appropriate model of a market economy. As argued by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) , the appropriate model of a market economy should balance disorder costs (which are caused by the expropriation by thieves, competitors, or tort-feasors) and dictatorship costs (which are caused by the expropriation by governments). Thus, a greater power of government vis-à-vis market is expected when disorder costs are higher and/or dictatorship costs are lower. The Survey contains information that allows us to gauge the disorder costs and dictatorship costs perceived by entrepreneurs, based on which we can carry out a comparative statics analysis.
In the Survey, one question asks each entrepreneur whether there exist in ‡uential producers in his/her industry that enjoy favorable market positions to facilitate input procurement and output sales and therefore they are dominant players in the market. It is expected that when facing such dominant competitors, private enterprises encounter higher disorder costs 8 and perceive a greater need for government regulations to alleviate market disorders Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003) . We construct a dummy variable called In ‡uential Competitors, and carry out an Ordered Probit regression of Power of Government vis-à-vis Market on In ‡uential Competitors along with a set of control variables. As shown in Column 1 of Table 7 , In ‡uential Competitors has a positive and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢ cient, which implies that the increase of disorder costs leads to a rise in the power of government vis-à-vis market as predicted by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) .
In the Survey, another question asks entrepreneurs about the amount of extralegal payments to the government made by the enterprises. As argued by Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005) , extralegal payments to the goverment measures the extent of government expropriation. It is thus expected that enterprises facing higher extralegal payments to the government encounter higher dictatorship costs and perceive a lesser need for the power of government vis-à-vis market such as less government regulation Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003) . We then construct a variable called Ratio of Extralegal Payments (measured as the ratio of extralegal payments to the government by the enterprise over its pro…t) and use it as a proxy for dictatorship costs, with a higher value indicating greater dictatorship costs. We carry out an Ordered Probit regression of Power of Government vis-à-vis Market on Ratio of Extralegal Payments along with a set of control variables. As shown in Column 2 of Table 7 , Ratio of Extralegal Payments has a negative and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢ cient, which implies that the increase of dictatorship costs leads to a fall of the power of government vis-à-vis market as predicted by Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) .
Does Rent Seeking Drive Our Results?
One may interpret our results as that those enterprises located regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market conduct more rent seeking activities and achieve better enterprise performance because they secure favors and protection from bureaucrats that enhance their business pro…tability. Of course, asking for government help in resolving business disputes could possibly re ‡ect rent seeking activity. However, the issue is whether rent seeking is the dominant force that drives the positive relationship between the power of government vis-à-vis market and enterprise performance.
Presumably if rent seeking is the driving force, an enterprise located in a region with a greater power of government vis-à-vis market would most likely obtain favors from the government in the forms of lower production costs and/or easier sales of its product or service. In the Survey, there are questions regarding whether the enterprise has di¢ culties in the following seven aspects of the enterprise operation: input procurement, access to bank loans, availability of production locations, supply of electricity and water, recruitment of skilled labor, sales of product, and sales of service. The answers to the access to bank loans range from 1 to 5 whereas the answers for the remaining six questions range from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating less di¢ culties in the speci…c operation. We conduct two-stage-least-squares regressions of these seven aspects of the enterprise operation on Power of Government vis-à-vis Market with the instrumental variable being the distance between the regional capital city and the national capital, Beijing. As show in Columns 1-7 of Table 8 , six of the seven estimated coe¢ cients are negative and the only positive one is statistically insigni…cant. These results suggest that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market do not obtain favors in the forms of lower production costs and/or easier sales of its product or service that are re ‡ected in these seven aspects.
9 In our opinion, these aspects we consider encompass all the important concerns of private enterprises in China. According to Asian Development Bank (2003) , the most serious constraints encountered by private enterprises include the di¢ culty in getting access to external …nance such as bank loans and the di¢ culty in recruiting skilled managers and technical sta¤. If rent seeking were the dominant force, at least some of the aspects we have examined should have turned out positive and signi…cant estimated coe¢ cients. Hence, we can largely rule out rent seeking as the primary force that drives our results.
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One may be curious to know why China's regional government o¢ cials have incentives to enforce private contracts and resolve business disputes for the sake of, as a net e¤ect, improving business environment rather than rent seeking. Here we can draw insights from the recent studies on marketpreserving federalism or regional decentralization in China's economic reforms (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Roland, Qian, and Xu, 2006; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008) . It is argued that the Chinese government system is characterized by substantial devolution of administrative power from the central government to regional administrations, in which …scal federalism or …scal decentralization is one prominent feature. Nonetheless, at the same time the central government keeps the political power to appoint, promote or sack regional governors. Governors of regions with better economic performance are more likely to be promoted. This regional decentralization under the control of the central government is most likely to generate regional competition for economic growth through various ways, one of which could be the interpretation and enforcement of laws and national ordinanaces by regional bureaucrats. This could explain to a large extent why rent seeking may not be the dominant force in shaping the nature of regulatory state in China.
Conclusion
In the past decades, we have witnessed the transition of many developing economies in various parts of the world toward the market economy. The variations in their transition paths and economic performance have led to intensive debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of various models of a market economy. Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) have argued that there are three distinct models of a market economy, i.e., private orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state, with an increasing power of government vis-à-vis market in the economy. As one moves from private orderings, to private litigations through courts, and regulatory state, the cost of disorder resulting from private expropriation decreases while that of dictatorship coming from state expropriation increases. The equilibrium choice then lies in the trade-o¤ between the cost of disorder and that of dictatorship.
In this paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China conducted in 1999, we construct an index to quantify the power of government vis-à-vis market, and …nd that the power of government vis-à-vis market is bene…cial to enterprise performance. Our results are robust to a set of controls related to entrepreneurial, enterprise, regional and industrial characteristics, and to the use of instrumental variable estimation. These results suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China.
We also …nd that the power of government vis-à-vis market is greater when disorder costs are higher or dictatorship costs are lower, thereby suggesting that the choice among the three models of market economy depends crucially upon the quality of institutional environment. In the case of China, protection of private properties was not written into its constitution until 2004, and the independence of courts is dubious. Thus, regulatory state emerges as a second-best choice for China in its transition to a market economy.
Our …ndings give an interpretation of China's successful reform drastically di¤erent from the earlier studies. The existing literature on economic transition almost invariably focuses on the comparison of the incremental reform approach in China versus the big bang approach in most other tran-sition economies such as Russia (e.g., Xu, 1999, 2006) . That literature implicitly assumes that China and Russia share the same target model of a market economy, i.e., private orderings and private litigation through courts, but only di¤er in their paths toward the target. However, in our view, China adopts regulatory state as an appropriate target model of a market economy based on the existing institutional constraints, which allows the state to maintain social order, provide a reasonable level of property rights protection, and avoid social disruption and disorganization in economic restructuring. O¢ cially, China has been pursuing the "socialist market economy model" in which regional governments employ extensive regulations, industrial policies and state ownership to promote economic development. This is largely consistent with the regulatory state model. In contrast, Russia is widely perceived to have conducted radical transformations toward laissez-faire capitalism, re ‡ected in some primary reform schemes such as the Gaidar program in the 1990s (Randolph, 1994; Perotti, 2002; Aziz, 2006) . This interpretation also sheds light on the so-called China puzzle, i.e., China achieved fast economic growth despite deeply ‡awed economic institutions including property rights protection and contract enforcement. According to our thesis, this is largely because China has adopted regulatory state as its model of a market economy, which requires few economic institutions to sustain the operation of markets. Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The estimation strategy used is 2SLS estimation. The First-stage results and the estimated coefficients of the control variable are not reported to save space (available upon request). Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The first stage of 2SLS includes the same control variables as those in the second stage but does not report these results to save the space (available upon request). Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The estimation strategy used is the ordered probit estimation. Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The estimation strategy used is 2SLS estimation. The First-stage results and the estimated coefficients of the control variable are not reported to save space (available upon request). Robust standard are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
